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There are a lot of developments happening right now in carbon markets in different parts of the world—from
New Zealand to Canada and many points in between. As policymakers continue to explore cap-and-trade in
the United States, there is much to learn about what does and doesn’t work from these carbon markets already
in place.
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Summary: Designing Successful Carbon Markets
Seminar by Professor Arthur van Benthem
There are a lot of developments happening right now in carbon markets in different parts of the 
world—from New Zealand to Canada and many points in between. As policymakers continue to explore 
cap-and-trade in the United States, there is much to learn about what does and doesn’t work from these 
carbon markets already in place.  
WHY PUT A PRICE ON CARBON?
In economic terms, carbon is an externality of production that levels 
certain costs to society at large, with regard to health care, the ef-
fects of climate change, etcetera. If no one directly pays for the cost 
of carbon emissions, companies will continue to produce emissions 
at an unchecked rate, resulting in ongoing negative effects. This is 
economically inefficient, meaning the gains to the polluting firms 
wind up being lower than the resulting cost to society as a whole. 
In order to correct for this market inefficiency, economists gener-
ally propose a price on carbon emissions. But how to do that is the 
sticky question.
SMART CARBON MARKET POLICY DESIGN
There are many different methods for reducing carbon emissions, 
some less expensive than others. Smart policy design would start 
with the more affordable abatement options before moving to the 
expensive ones. This sounds straightforward, but it actually isn’t 
how many governments behave. Instead, governments often try to 
pick what they think is a winning strategy (for instance, fostering 
investment in afforestation or solar photovoltaics) and then create 
incentives to help that cherry-picked option succeed. Cap-and-
trade automatically targets the cheaper options and leaves aside 
the more expensive abatement alternatives.
HOW DOES CAP-AND-TRADE WORK?   
In theory, cap-and-trade is fairly simple. A government or regulator 
sets a limit (i.e., cap) on total emissions that an economy can pro-
duce. Allowances of equal value to the cap are distributed among 
the various firms within the economy. Firms need to make sure that 
for every ton of CO2 emissions they emit, they have the exact same 
amount of allowances. Firms can buy and sell allowances directly 
with each other (i.e., trade). At the end of the year, the total tons of 
emissions produced should equal the total number of allowances. 
Cap-and-trade is very cost-effective because it lets the firms them-
selves sort out who can reduce emissions most cheaply.
But there is a big gap between theory and practice, as the history 
of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) makes 
clear.
“Smart policy design would start 
with the more affordable abatement 
options before moving to the 
expensive ones. ”
 
FIVE LESSONS FROM EUROPE
Lesson 1: Keep it simple —focus on the large polluters.
The European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme is currently the 
largest carbon trading system in the world. Established in 2005, 
the ETS was a response to the Kyoto Protocol, when all the different 
European countries agreed to cut emissions. One rule that the EU 
got right was to keep it manageable and focus on heavy industry 
and power generation, as these include the relatively few firms that 
are responsible for a large percentage of emissions.
Lesson 2: Get the cap right—the cap determines everything 
and is the most important decision in a cap and trade 
system.
In 2005, the ETS emissions certificates were trading at an average 
of €25 per ton. While it is difficult to know exactly what the social 
cost of carbon emissions is, €25 is on the low end of the range but 
in the correct order of magnitude. But in a single week in 2006, the 
price on CO2 collapsed from €30 to €10 very quickly, and ultimate-
ly crashed to zero.
What precipitated this price collapse was that prior to 2005, the EU 
commission had to guess what CO2 emissions were across Europe. 
It turned out their guess was incorrect. In 2006, for the first time, 
third-party auditors measured the emissions of all the firms in the 
ETS and the emissions were much lower than the market expected. 
The price plummeted as the entire market realized it would be very 
easy to comply with the cap.
Lesson 3: Allow for banking—saving excess allowances for 
use in future compliance periods.
Banking, where firms can store certificates for future use, can help 
prevent the kind of price crash that occurred in the ETS. Firms will 
bank their allowances if they believe the price of abatement will 
increase in the future. Regulators are in favor of banking because 
firms decrease their emissions in the short-term, rather than use 
their allowances, and the allowance price remains consistent over 
time. While saving allowances is encouraged, borrowing on future 
certificates is very risky and is almost never allowed.
Lesson 4: Sell a large share of allowances at auction.
The EU had initially given away allowances for free, leading to wind-
fall profits for firms that then traded on their certificates. While 
firms passed the CO2 price onto their customers, they never paid 
for their allowances, which led to excess profits. Instead, at least 
some portion of the allowances should be auctioned to the highest 
bidders via quarterly auctions. On average, firms lose and consum-
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ers gain from revenues generated by the auction, as well as from 
cleaner air. Who specifically benefits from the revenues will depend 
on how they are spent. Whether allowances are auctioned or given 
away for free does not matter for total emissions—the cap is fixed. 
It only matters for how the costs and benefits of the program are 
split between consumers and firms.
Lesson 5: A cap and trade system needs an auction price 
floor as well as a price cap.
Even after lowering the cap, allowing for banking, and giving away 
fewer allowances for free, among other reforms, the ETS carbon 
market still was not functioning well. Prices were still low, in the €5 
per ton range—too low to spur any clean tech innovation. So the EU 
ultimately added a system that acts similar to a price floor. With a 
price floor, allowances are sold at auction and cannot be sold below 
a given minimum price. At the end of the auction, if some allow-
ances remain unsold, they are destroyed, in effect reducing the cap. 
Removing allowances from the system ensures the price will never 
go below whatever floor you want to have. On the other hand, it 
is important that prices don’t go too high either. A carbon market 
must not be overly aggressive if it wants to stay politically stable.
After fifteen years of trial and error, the ETS system has returned to 
an average price of €25 per ton of CO2 and the EU has a cap-and-
trade system that works reasonably well. 
CONCLUSION
Policymakers looking to expand and improve the carbon trading 
systems that exist in the U.S. should heed the lessons of the ETS 
example. But even if a carbon market is well designed, garnering 
public support often comes down to the question of how revenues 
from the market should be distributed. There is, however, no model 
for revenue distribution that is ideal in all circumstances. For in-
stance, Washington state introduced a carbon tax ballot initiative in 
2016 that centered on a “revenue-neutral” carbon tax, but the lack 
of “clear winners” contributed to its defeat by a margin of 59-41. A 
revised attempt in 2018 pitched it as a “cap-and-invest” initiative 
that would spur clean-tech investment, but it too failed, though 
by a smaller margin. In the meantime, Canada has authorized a 
national carbon tax that functions as a “cap-and-dividend” scheme, 
where the revenues get rebated to consumers—a model similar 
to that used in the 2019 Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend 
Act, currently before Congress. What revenue arrangements will 
be politically palatable in the U.S., whether nationally, regionally, or 
locally, remains unclear.
